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Attorney for Defendant and Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURIE L. FREEDMAN (BARNETT), 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
GILBERT FREEDMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20030476-CA 
District Court No. 954400884 
APPEAL FROM ALL FINAL ORDERS OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Whether husband Gilbert Freedman (Appellant) is appealing the trial court's Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce, filed 
August 26,1997, (not "September 1999" as stated by Appellant on page 4 of his Brief), finalizing his 
divorce from Laurie L. Freedman (Barnett) (Appellee); or Appellant is appealing the miscellaneous 
motions or the cumulative final post-judgment Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 
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Amended Verified Couterclaim (Exhibit No. 13 of Appellant's Breif), filed April 24, 2003, 
jurisdiction appears to be in dispute on any appeal of opinions of the trial court; and Appellee 
supports summary dismissal by this court, pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P.4(a), for lack of 
jurisdiction untimely filed. 
Additionally, Appellant cannot be appealing the pending Order to Show Cause awaiting 
adjudication before the trial court, as this court lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to UTAHR. APP. P.4(b), 
where no final order is filed disposing of this matter. There is also the pending ruling wanting 
jurisdiction, on the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to Appellee by the trial court, 
outside this court's opinion. There are no other related or prior, implied, inferred or real appeals 
filed in connection with this action. 
Yet, to settle any possibility that Appellant may instigate another frivolous round of legal 
proceedings in this divorce, Appellee acquieses to any finding that this court would seize upon to 
exercise it's lawful jurisdiction - ending once and for all the parties' legal relationships. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the Trial court err in ruling that the "binding agreement (Exhibit No. 1 of 
Appellant's Breif) signed by the parties before the divorce decree was resolved and agreed upon, 
stipulated to and integrated, and became merged with the decree of divorce in this case and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and there is no longer a binding agreement that survived that 
judgment." See April 1, 2003, hearing transcript page 30 lines 17-23 (Exhibit "A"). The ruling is 
reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial court. Robinson v. Tripco Investment, 2000 
UT App 20,21 P.3d 219; Macris & Associates v. Images & Attitude. 941 P.2d 636 Utah App. 1997, 
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quoting Jones, Waldo. Holdbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1370 (Utah 1996); 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App. 1988); Miller v. USAA Casualty 
Insurance Co., 2002 UT 6, quoting Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 
(Utah 1995); American Interstate Mtg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, 41 P.3d 1142; 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in ruling that the motion to set aside the decree is denied? 
The ruling is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial court. Maertz v. Maertz, 827 
P.2d 259 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in ruling that the motion to reopen the case be denied? The 
ruling is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial court. 
Issue 4: Did Appellant have ineffective assistance of counsel? SLW/UTAH, STATE v. 
MUNSON, 972 P.2d 418 at 422 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(B) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(B), provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(B) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether hereto fore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party;.. .The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. 
Doctrine of Merger - The Judgment is the final, integrated agreement of the parties and abrogates 
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all prior agreements, whether written or oral. 
Doctrine of Res Judicata - When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata, as to those 
issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair 
opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding. 
Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) - Prevents parties or their privies from re-litigating 
"particular issues that have been contested and resolved." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
This is a matter of a divorce that was filed by Appellee in April 1995 The Bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce was entered in October 1996, and the final Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce were signed and entered by the 
Court on August 26, 1997. After the final Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered 
by the Court, Appellee continued to allow Appellant to live in the basement of the marital residence. 
In June 1999, Appellee had to evict Appellant from the marital residence due to his failure to pay his 
rent, and his constant interference with her personal affairs. Appellee filed an eviction claim and 
Appellant responded by filing a counterclaim. After several hearings and orders to consolidate all 
issues into the original divorce case, Appellant filed a Second Amended Counterclaim. Appellee filed 
a Motion to Dismiss in response to the Second Amended Counterclaim. The Court heard Oral 
Arguments on April 1, 2003, and issued the Order, which is now the subject of this appeal. 
(B) Statement of Facts 
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A TTORhEY FOR PlAINTIFFlAPPELLEE 
Appellant's Breif). On or about September 24, 1996, after many meetings, discovery, and many 
hearings, the Court granted a Bifrucated Decree of Divorce (hereinafter "Decree"). The Decree was 
signed by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen and entered by the Court on October 1, 1996. In that 
Decree, Appellee was restored to her maiden name of Barnett. 
After the Decree was entered, Appellee graciously allowed Appellant to rent the basement 
of the marital home until he could find other living arrangements. On or about December 3, 1996, 
the parties met with their respective attorneys and worked out a Preliminary Settlement Agreement 
which was then executed by both parties. This was the only agreement entered into and signed by 
the parties that day. 
On or about December 6, 1996, the parties contacted the Court and stipulated to having the 
Court strike the trial that was scheduled for that day upon the grounds that the parties had reached 
a stipulated full and final resolution of all matters pending before the Court. Also, it was agreed that 
Appellee's attorney would prepare the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit No. 2 of Appellant's Breif) 
and send it to Appellant's attorney for approval and signature by all parties. 
In or about February 1997, Appellee's attorney submitted the final Settlement Agreement to 
Appellant's attorney for approval and execution. 
On or about March 19, 1997, with the approval from her attorney, Appellee wrote a letter to 
Appellant. The letter reiterated, that due to the fact that he was a renter, he did not have authority 
to spend her money for improvements to the property, and he did not have the authority to deduct 
any money from his agreed upon rent. This was consistent with the parties Settlement Agreement. 
Between February 1997 and April 1997, Appellant refused to execute the Settlement 
Agreement, and refused to even respond to the documents sent over by Appellee's attorney to 
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Appellant's attorney Accordingly, Appellee's attorney filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement with the Court Oral arguments were set but thereafter the parties came to an agreement 
On or about June 9, 1997, Appellee and Appellant executed the Settlement Agreement and 
filed the same with the Court on or about June 10, 1997 In August 1997, the Court entered an 
Order to Enforce the Settlement Agreement On or about August 26, 1997, the Honorable Steven 
L Hansen entered Judgment by ordering the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce reflecting the arrangement 
in the Settlement Agreement 
Paragraph 13 of the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce slates "That the parties 
desire the terms of this Decree be confidential and the Court finds that desire to be fair and 
reasonable " Paragraph 16 goes on to state "The court concludes that this file should be sealed and 
should not be opened except upon motion and with notice to the parties and an opportunity to be 
heard " 
The parties acknowledged that the Settlement Agreement resolved all issues raised by the 
pleadings and that a Decree of Divorce should be entered by the Court, consistent with the terms and 
provisions of the Settlement Agreement In fact, Appellant intended to sell Starfire Industries The 
value of Starfire Industries was believed to far exceed that of the marital property assigned to 
Appellee, in both the Settlement Agreement and the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
Appellant did not oppose or otherwise challenge the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce, or any other aspect of the 
Court's Judgment thereafter In its own minute entry, dated September 10, 1997, the Court 
instructed the attorney for Appellant to proceed, if desired, by Motion if he had any objection to the 
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Court's entered Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
Appellant continued to live in the basement of Appellee's home until December 1998 At this 
time, Appellee served Appellant with a 15-day Notice to Quit and Vacate for failure to pay his rent 
In or about May 1999, after Appellant again refused to pay his rent, and without authorization from 
Appellee, Appellant changed the locks on the home, and continued to harass service people and 
friends, Appellee then served Appellant with another eviction notice Upon notice of his eviction, 
Appellant sent a letter to Appellee threatening a "fight in court " 
On or about May 21,1999, Appellee informed Appellant, for the final time, that he must make 
the appropriate arrangements to vacate the premises and remove his personal items 
On or about August 13, 1999, Barnett was served with a Writ of Execution for an unrelated 
Judgment previously entered against Appellant in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Case No 920905473 Pursuant to said Writ, Appellee made all of Appellant's personal 
property available to David Overholt, Esq , counsel of record in Case No 920905473 Mr Overholt 
held a Constable's Sale on or about September 7, 1999, and all items not sold at the sale were 
delivered to Mr Overholt by Appellee, and then given to Appellant by Mr Overholt In a letter dated 
September 30, 1999, Mr Overholt indicates that he returned all exempt and personal property that 
did not sell at the Constable's Sale - including Appellant's mother's jewelry - directly to Appellant 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under the Doctrine of Merger, all agreements were consolidated and merged into the final 
Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Supplemental 
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Decree of Divorce. Appellee acted within the scope of that Judgment. Under the Doctrine of Res 
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion), all issues presented by Appellant in his Second 
Amended Counterclaim were adjudicated during the initial divorce proceedings, and therefore are 
barred from being brought forth again. 
Under Rule 60(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Appellant had three (3) months 
after the judgment or entry of the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce to file a Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree. Appellant did not file a motion before the time limit se1 by the Rule. 
Defendant failed, for over three (3) years, to file a Motion to Reopen the case pursuant to the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, and did so only after counsel for Appellee addressed the matter 
during Oral Arguments. 
Appellant repeatedly informed counsel that he was of sound mind and had competent counsel 
throughout the proceedings. The fact that counsel refused to perpetrate his lies did not make 
Appellant's counsel incompetent. 
ARGUMENTS 
Appellant has submitted that the parties entered into a binding agreement. This agreement 
apparently took place outside the confines of the Judgment that was ultimately and finally entered by 
the Court, and at the same time that the Preliminary Settlement Agreement was negotiated and 
executed. However, the "binding agreement" is not dated. There is no record in the Divorce file that 
such a contract ever existed, was ever filed, or was ever included in the Court determination of final 
judgment. Also note, that Appellee's signature on the afore mentioned document was "Laurie L. 
Freedman," when in fact Appellee had used her maiden name for all purposes since September 26, 
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1996, when the Bifurcated Divorce Decree went into effect. In fact, she signed the Preliminary 
Settlement Agreement as "Laurie Freedman Barnett," which comports with the use of her maiden 
name at the very time Appellant asserts that there was a second agreement. 
If the agreements were reached on the same day, and Appellant, along with his prior 
attorneys, believed that the "binding agreement" was the final meeting of the minds, Appellant had 
ample opportunity to present and argue the fictional agreement's merits in his Memorandum in 
Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, but clearly omitted any reference 
to the fictional agreement. 
Any and all agreements previously entered into by the parties were merged into the final 
Judgment of the Court, and therefore, fall under the rules that govern Judgments. Appellant seeks 
damages which he admits are the direct and proximate result of the "binding agreement," under the 
assumption that it is a valid contract. If the "binding agreement" was ever, at any time, a legally 
binding negotiated contract between the parties, it has matured as a direct result of the entry of the 
Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce. Any presumed duty to perform under the contract is 
merged in its entirety into the final Judgment entered by the Court. Consistent with merger doctrine, 
the Judgment "...is the final, integrated agreement of the parties and abrogates all prior agreements, 
whether written or oral." Robinson v. Tripco Investment Therefore, any and all obligations of the 
parties under contract, prior to Judgment, are discharged by the Judgment. If the "binding 
agreement" ever existed, as a reflection of negotiations between the parties, it was adjudicated during 
arguments on the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, merged and discharged by the 
Judgment, and the Judgment supercedes any agreement or contract previously entered into by the 
parties during settlement negotiations for the divorce. 
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Appellant contends that he relied on the "binding agreement" to his detriment. However, 
Appellee continually spoke with Appellant about rent and the disposition of the property that now 
belonged to her pursuant to the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce. Consistent with her 
letter dated March 16, 1997, written prior to the final entry of the Decree, but after the Agreement 
had been reached, Appellee clearly reiterates that Appellant was a renter amd nothing more. 
Amended Verified Counterclaim was properly dismissed under the 
Doctrine of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) 
All issues now presented to the court have been decided by this Court prior to final entry of 
the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce. "The party seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel must establish 
four elements: First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at 
hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous 
action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the previous action. 
Fourth, the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been 
either a party or privy to a party in the previous action." Macris & Associates v. Images & Attitude 
Appellee has met all prongs of the test for proof of relief under the Doctrine of Res Judicata for 
Collateral Estoppel. 
The issues in the Divorce and the Amended Verified Counterclaim are identical. There was 
a final adjudication which Appellant has not appealed nor disputed in any way until now. There has 
been no argument presented that the Court acted in any other way, but competently and fairly, and 
all previous parties are the same as those herein. "When there has been an adjudication, it becomes 
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res judicata, as to those issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the 
party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." Throckmorton 
v. Throckmorton "The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously 
litigated issues from being relitigated." Miller v. US AA Casualty Insurance Co. Res judicata has two 
prongs: claim preclusion and issue preclusion... Issue preclusion... prevents parties or their privies 
from relitigating "particular issues that have been contested and resolved." American Interstate Mtg. 
Corp. v. Edwards 
Appellant had the available remedy to appeal or oppose the final Judgment but decided not 
to, or failed to do so, whichever the case may be. Consequently, even if the Court views the facts 
in a light most favorable to Appellant, it must also see that all facts have been presented and 
adjudicated in previous actions. 
The Amended Verified Counterclaim was properly dismissed under the doctrine of merger, 
doctrine of res judicata for lack of jurisdiction and Collateral Estoppel, primarily because the "binding 
agreement" signed by the parties before the divorce decree was resolved and agreed upon, stipulated 
to and integrated, and became merged with the decree of divorce in this case and the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and there is no longer a binding agreement that survived that judgment. 
Motion to set aside the Decree of Divorce was properly denied under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure governing relief from Judgment 
Rule 60(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE clearly provides that a motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. Relief was available to Appellant to file a motion to reverse or otherwise 
vacate the Judgment entered by Judge Hansen in this matter. In fact, any objection Appellant might 
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have had to the Judgment was entreated by the Court in the Minute Entry, dated September 10,1997. 
Appellant did not file any motion, or pursue any remedy possibly available to him within the three (3) 
month time limit set by Rule 60(b), essentially or for all intents and purposes denying the Courts 
entreatment to respond. 
It is well recognized under Utah law, that although relief may be sought in the form of a 
complaint, which can be treated as an independent action, uan action may be treated as a motion when 
there is no prejudice to the opposing party" Maertz v. Maertz. Therefore, the Amended Verified 
Counterclaim, when considered a Rule 60(b) Motion, is subject to the rule's "reasonable time" 
limitation. Appellant was made aware of the Judgment being entered on August 26,1997, and made 
aware of once again, when the Court entreated his counsel in September 1997, reminding Appellant's 
attorney that any objection must be made by motion. Appellant was reminded yet again, when 
Appellee relied on the Judgment when she served Appellant with notice of eviction on or about 
December 28,1998, and again on May 17, 1999. It would be preposterous for the Court to conclude 
that Appellant was without notice that his right to timely file a Rule 60(b) Motion had tolled -
especially in light of the Court itself educating Appellant of the time period specified in the rule and 
that the Judgment would stand without filing such a motion. Appellant failed to file a motion within 
the time frame set by Rule 60(b), and therefore his Amended Verified Counterclaim was properly 
dismissed. 
Motion to Reopen was properly denied 
Appellant failed to file a Motion to Reopen, pursuant to the provision of the Decree of 
Divorce which states: "That the parties desire the terms of this Decree be confidential and the Court 
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finds that desire to be fair and reasonable." Paragraph 16 goes on to state, "The Court concludes 
that this file should be sealed and should not be opened except upon Motion and with notice to the 
parties and an opportunity to be heard." The Motion to Reopen was properly denied. 
Appellant does not meet the burden of proof required for 
ineffective assistance of counsel 
Appellant had raised, for the first time on appeal, the issue that he was a victim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel,"... a defendant must show, 
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." SLW/UTAKL STATE v Munson It furthermore 
states "that to establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must show 'a reasonable probability exists 
that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different.'" Appellant's assertion that 
he is dyslexic, and old, does not show evidence of ineffective counsel. Appellant repeatedly informed 
counsel that he was of sound mind and had competent counsel throughout the proceedings. The fact 
that counsel refused to perpetrate his lies does not make his counsel incompetent. Finally, Appellant 
has shown no proof of actual incompetence by his multiple counsels, or that the outcome would have 
been any different. 
CONCLUSION 
The terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement executed by the parties on or about 
June 9, 1997, were sealed by the Court upon the execution of the Amended Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce. Appellant was well 
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aware that it would not be prudent for counsel to present, as evidence, that which was ordered sealed 
by the Court unless the case had been reopened by the Court, upon motion, with notice to the parties, 
and presentation of oral arguments by the parties. Appellant sought damages which he admits are 
a direct and proximate cause of the "binding agreement," presumed to be entered into by the parties. 
The "binding agreement," should it have ever existed as a settlement negotiation, has matured as a 
direct result of the entry of the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce. Any presumed duty to 
perform under it was merged into the Judgment, and any and all obligations of the parties under 
contract, prior to Judgment, are discharged by the Judgment. The statute of limitations is a sufficient 
defense for relief from the causes of action complained of, and in fact, it is the defense allowed by the 
law and also agreed to by the parties upon entry of the Judgment. 
Appellant failed to timely file a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Judgment. He bases 
his whole counterclaim on two (2) agreements, one being the Preliminary Agreement, and the other 
being the "binding agreement." Regardless of their existence, they were merged into the final 
Settlement Agreement and subsequent Judgment and discharged thereby. It would be grossly unfair 
and highly prejudicial to Appellee for this Court to alter the final Judgment. 
Appellant has provided no proof supporting his appeal and not proof that the ruling of the 
Court on April 1, 2003, or the subsequent Order entered by the Court should be reversed. He has 
not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by not distributing the marital assets fairly and 
equitably, and by not making findings of fact properly. Appellant has not shown any evidence to 
prove that the Court did not rely on a valid agreement between the parties. Appellant has not shown 
that he did not have competent legal representation, and has shown no evidence that he was denied 
due process of law. 
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Given the trial court's detailed findings in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in its 
determinations regarding the final orders on all issues stated herein. Additionally, Appellee requests 
attorney fees due to the frivolous nature of this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 2004. 
CLAYNE I COREY PLLC: 
By-^Claynd n^orey 




























think you have a claim in American Fork, it's been 
consolidated into this court, would you please rewrite it 
all, because you didn't write it in the beginning, and 
present it to this Court here to see if you still have a 
claim 
ARGUMENT BY MR. BUSHMAN 
MR. BUSHMAN: Your Honor, if I may respond just a 
little bit on that. The, the eviction claim of the 
plaintiff was what was dismissed by the Court after 
adjudication. The counterclaim of my client for breach of 
contract lived on. 
THE JUDGE: It survived and that's here today 
and you're asking to amend it, and there's a motion to 
dismiss. 
Okay. Well, thank you. Thank you both. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: It seems to me that the claim that 
there's a binding agreement signed by the parties before the 
divorce decree was resolved and agreed upon, stipulated to 
and integrated, and became merged with the decree of divorce 
in this case and the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
and there is no longer a binding agreement that survived that 
judgment. 
So, therefore, I'm going to dismiss the amended 
verified counterclaim in this case that has survived the 
FREEDMAN VS. FREEDMAN APRIL 1, 2003 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
